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Minnesota Sales Tax: Retailer Reliance
on Administrative Interpretations
I. INTRODUCTION
The Minnesota Attorney General and the State Commissioner of Taxation have historically had the power to interpret
state tax laws by official opinion,1 ruling and regulation. 2 The
Minnesota Supreme Court has consistently held that the state
cannot be estopped from collecting back taxes even when the
failure to pay in the first instance was the result of reliance on
administrative interpretations subsequently held erroneous.3
This result has been justified by the principle that the state cannot generally be estopped when acting in its sovereign capacity. 4
The enactment of the sales tax by the 1967 session of the Minnesota Legislature 5 has created the need for an exception to this
general principle. The reason for this need is that a retailer who
has reasonably relied on an erroneous administrative interpretation in not collecting a sales tax, and who is later required to pay
a back tax, will have to pay the sum due out of his own fundsa result which is contrary to legislative intent and a misdemeanor if accomplished directly.6 Thus, reasonable reliance on
an erroneous interpretation of a sales tax exemption, in effect,
shifts the burden of the tax from the purchaser to the seller.7
This problem is compounded by the sales tax's numerous ambiguities8 and uncertainties 9 which have resulted in a large de1. See Mnw. STAT. §§ 8.05, 8.07, & 270.09 (1967).
2. Mne. STAT. §§ 271.16 & 296.27 (1967).
3. Spratt v. Hatfield, 267 Minn. 535, 127 N.W.2d 545 (1964); State
v. Illinois Cent. Ry., 200 Minn. 583, 274 N.W. 828 (1937); State v. Brooks,
183 Minn. 251, 236 N.W. 316 (1931); State v. Horr, 165 Minn. 1, 205 N.W.
444 (1925).
4. E.g., Spratt v. Hatfield, 267 Minn. 535, 127 N.W.2d 545 (1964);
Board of Educ. v. Sand, 227 Minn. 202, 34 N.W.2d 689 (1948).
5. ixNI. STAT. §§ 297A.00-.60 (1967).
6. MVne. STAT. § 297A.03(2) (1967):
It shall be unlawful for any retailer to advertise or hold out or
state to the public or any customer, directly or indirectly, that
the tax or any part thereof will be assumed or absorbed by the
retailer .

. .

. Any person violating this provision shall be

guilty of a misdemeanor.
7. This shift would not occur in cases involving other types of
taxes since the taxpayer would have paid the tax out of his own funds
even if the interpretation had been correct in the first instance. Thus,
it is only a question of whether he pays it when originally due or at a
later date which may, in effect, give him an interest free loan in the
amount of the tax.
8. E.g., MlN. STAT. § 297A.25(1) (b) (1967) (the extent of the
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mand for administrative interpretations and a particular need for
the retailer to be able to rely on official opinions. Although it is
clear that courts should not be denied the power to overrule
erroneous interpretations, 0 the peculiar situation presented by
the sales tax should lead them to permit retailers to raise the defense of estoppel to preclude retroactive applications of the
correct interpretation.
The purpose of this Note is to examine the powers of the
Attorney General and Commissioner of Taxation to interpret the
Minnesota Sales Tax and to point up the present dangers of
relying on their official interpretations. In addition, it will be
urged that the bench allow assertion of the defense of estoppel in
sales tax cases, or alternatively, that the legislature make it clear
that changes in official administrative interpretations-which include Attorney General opinions-only be applied prospectively
when retroactive application would substantially prejudice retail sellers who reasonably relied upon them. In this connection,
an amendment to the present statute will be proposed which
would solve the problems posed by a seller's reasonable reliance
on sales tax rules or regulations and Attorney General opinions.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATIONS

A. THE POWER TO INTERPRET THE SALEs TAX
1. The Attorney General
Although the sales tax act does not explicitly grant the Minnesota Attorney General interpretive powers, it is clear that he
possesses and can exercise such powers when requested to do so
medicinal exemption currently covered by Op. MiNN. ATTY. GEN., July
31, 1967, and Department Ruling: Sales and Use Tax Division, Sept. 1,
1967, which state that the exemption is not limited to prescription

drugs and medicines); MnN. STAT. § 297A.25(1) (d) (1967) (the extent

of the exemption for tangible personal property whose ultimate destination is outside the state, currently covered by Department Ruling: Sales
and Use Tax Division, Sept. 22, 1967, which states that the retailer must
deliver it outside the state or send it by common carrier, parcel post
or the U.S. mail); MINN. STAT. § 297A.25(1) (k) (1967) (the extent of
the isolated or occasional sale exemption, currently covered by Department Ruling: Sales and Use Tax Division, Sept. 22, 1967).

9. The sales tax is silent about the transitional period and the

status of goods purchased pursuant to contracts entered into prior to the
effective date of the tax. That question is covered in Op. Aln=. ATTY.
GEN., July 27, 1967, and Department Ruling: Sales and Use Tax Division, Aug. 23, 1967.

10.

See Marx v. Goodrich, 286 App. Div. 913, 914, 142 N.Y.S.2d 28,

30 (1955).
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by proper persons.1 The statutes establishing the office of Attorney General require him to give legal advice to state officials,
boards, and commissions on all matters within their purview and
on all questions of law submitted by either house of the legislature.12 He is also required to issue written opinions on questions of public importance submitted by the attorney for any
state political subdivision and on questions arising under laws
relating to the public schools when submitted by the commissioner of education. 1 3 These duties obviously include answering
any questions concerning the sales tax submitted by the persons
4
or entities listed above.'
In addition, the statutes creating the office of Minnesota
Commissioner of Taxation provide that the commissioner may
request an Attorney General's opinion on any matter within the
scope of his functions-which obviously includes administration
of the sales tax' 5- and that any written opinion in response to
such a request "shall have the force and effect of law unless and
until overruled by a decision of the board of tax appeals or a
court of competent jurisdiction."'16
2.

The Commissioner of Taxation

The Minnesota Commissioner of Taxation, unlike the Attorney General, is expressly granted interpretive authority in the
Sales Tax Act itself. He is charged with administering and enforcing the sales tax"' and is directed to "promulgate all needful
rules and regulations . . . not inconsistent with its provisions.
S.. "Is These rules and regulations are given the force and effect
of law.' 9 At first glance, the latter provision seems to protect
sellers who rely on erroneous rules or regulations in not collecting a sales tax since the Act provides that the seller is not required to remit any more tax than "he is authorized and required
11. See M.i&N. STAT. §§ 8.05, 8.07, & 270.09 (1967).
12. MmN. STAT. § 8.05 (1967).
13. Id. § 8.07.
14. E.g., Op. Mn=. ATTY. GENr., Oct. 24, 1967 (submitted by Hopkins' city attorney); Op. MiNx. ATT=. GEN., Sept. 14, 1967 (submitted
by Commissioner of Education); Op. MArNN. ATTY. GEN., Aug. 2, 1967
(submitted by the attorneys for the Duluth Housing Authority).
15. AI=. STAT. § 297A.29 (1967).
16. Id. § 270.09.
17. Id. § 297A.37: "The commissioner shall administer and enforce
the assessment and collection of the taxes imposed by sections ..
18. Id. § 297A.29.

19. Id.

.
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by law to collect from the purchaser." 20 This apparent protection is illusory, however, since the Commissioner is only authorized to promulgate rules and regulations not inconsistent with
the statute and only those have the force and effect of law. 21 Until a rule or regulation is declared inconsistent by a court, it will
have the apparent force and effect of law, thereby carrying with
22
it the likelihood that sellers will feel compelled to rely on it.
Presumably, if the Commissioner himself changed a rule or regulation without a judicial determination of inconsistency, he
would have to show that it was "inconsistent" with the statute
23
before he could hold the seller for back sales taxes.

In two instances the statutory language indicates that the
commissioner, in promulgating rules and regulations on the sales
tax, is bound by opinions of the Attorney General. The first is
when the opinion is issued in response to a written request by the
Commissioner himself,2 4 and the second is when it is issued to the
Commissioner of Education on sales tax questions involving the
public schools. 25

Since these are the only two instances ex-

pressly provided for by statute, it seems that the Commissioner is
free to disregard all other opinions of the Attorney General on the
26
sales tax.

20. Id. § 297A.02.
21. Id. § 297A.29.
22. Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 55 Pa. D. & C.
343, 358 (Philadelphia County Ct. 1945):
Whether or not the former regulation was within the scope of
the regulatory power given to him by the ordinance, the fact is
that he did promulgate it under color of an assumed authority,
and by doing so he expressly invited defendant and similarly
situated employers not to deduct and return the tax.
23. See MiiNN. STAT. §§ 297A.29 & 297A.21 (1967).
Since the
rules and regulations of the commissioner have the force and effect
of law unless inconsistent with the statute, and since the retailer
is not required to submit any more tax to the state than he is
authorized and required by law to collect from the purchaser, it is
clear that before the commissioner could change a ruling, without a
judicial determination of inconsistency, and hold a retailer for a back
tax, he would have to show that the ruling had actually been inconsistent with the statute.
24. See Id. § 270.09:,.
. . [A]ny written opinion of the attorney
general upon any such matter rendered in response to such request shall
have the force and effect of law unless and until overruled by a decision
of the tax court or a court of competent jurisdiction."
25.

Id. § 8.07:

"

.

.and on all [such] school matters such opinion

shall be decisive until the question involved shall be decided otherwise
by a court of competent jurisdiction."
26. See, e.g., Crown Concrete Co. v. Conkling, 247 Iowa 609, 75
N.W.2d 351 (1956); Village of Blaine v. Independent School Dist. No. 12,
272 Minn. 343, 138 N.W.2d 32 (1965).
It seems obvious, since opinions of the Attorney General are not
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An Outside Limit on InterpretivePowers

The power of the Attorney General and Commissioner of
Taxation to interpret the sales tax is, of course, limited by the Act
itself. Thus, interpretations adding provisions clearly beyond the
coverage of the statute are prohibited.27 While the issue of
whether administrators have abused their interpretive powers
is normally one of statutory construction, rather than constitutionality, an outside limit on the exercise of these powers is available in the constitutional doctrine 28 that a legislature cannot delegate what the Minnesota Supreme Court has referred to as pure
legislative power. 29 If a legislature cannot constitutionally delegate a certain degree of legislative power, it is elementary that an
administrator cannot assume that degree of power under his
statutory authority. However, when an administrator does attempt to wield such powers, it is neither necessary nor desirable
for a court to strike down the delegation as unconstitutional. 30
It is sufficient to use the doctrine as an aid to statutory construction, thereby construing the delegation as constitutional while
holding that the administrator has exceeded his authority under
the statute. 31
binding upon a court when interpreting'a law, that absent express
statutory language to the contrary they would not be binding upon
state officials.
27. See, e.g., Howard Pore, Inc. v. Revenue Comm'r, 322 Mich. 49,
65-66, 33 N.W.2d 657, 664 (1948):
In any event, the liability for the payment of taxes, and the
determination of the amount thereof, depend on the statute.
Such liability may not be imposed by the rules and regulations
of the department ....
By the same process of reasoning, liability for a tax imposed by statute may not be obviated by
administrative action on the part of those charged with enforcing the law.
28. MwNm.CoNsT. art. I. § 1:
The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct departments-legislative, executive, and judicial; and no person or
persons belonging to or constituting one of these departments
shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of
the others, except in the instances expressly provided in this
constitution.
29. E.g., Lee v. Delmont, 228 Minn. 101, 112, 36 N.W.2d 530, 538
(1949): "It is elementary that the legislature-except where expressly
authorized by the constitution as in the case of municipalities--cannot
delegate purely legislative power to any other body, person, board, or
commission."
30. See Id. at 115, 36 N.W.2d at 539: "The law provides an ample
remedy for the abuse of a power without attacking the validity of its
delegation. See State ex rel. Krausman v. Streeter, 26 Minn. 458, S3
N.W.2d 56." In the Krausman case, plaintiff obtained a writ of mandamus requiring the board of barber examiners to issue him a license
which they had arbitrarily withheld.
31. See Mnwx. STAT. § 645.16 (1967): "The object of all interpre-
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While the legislature may not constitutionally delegate
purely legislative power, it may confer on state officials a certain
type of discretion which is in most respects indistinguishable
from legislative power. This discretion has been defined as the
power to determine the facts or circumstances which automatically bring a statute into play by virtue of its own terms or intent.8 2 Even this delegation, however, must be accompanied by
reasonably clear policies or standards, so that the law will take
effect by virtue of its own terms, rather than because the administrator feels it desirable or expedient. The power to determine when and upon whom a law shall take effect or the desirability of having it do so can neither be constitutionally delegated by the legislature 33 nor assumed by an administrator.3 4
tation and construction of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature" and Mi:Nw. STAT. § 645.17 (1967):
In ascertaining the intention of the legislature the courts may
be guided by the following presumptions:
(3) The legislature does not intend to violate the constitution ... of this state....

See also Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Arizona v. California, 373
U.S. 546, 626-27 (1962) (Harlan's dissent):
The delegation of such unrestrained authority to an executive official raises, to say the least, the gravest constitutional
doubts. ... These substantial constitutional doubts do not, of

course, lead to the conclusion that the Project Act must be held
invalid. Rather, they buttress the conviction, already firmly
grounded in the Act and its history, that no such authority was
vested in the Secretary by Congress (emphasis added).
32. 228 Minn. at 113, 36 N.W.2d at 538.
33. Anderson v. Commissioner of Highways, 267 Minn. 308, 126
N.W.2d 778 (1964); State ex rel. Brown v. Johnson, 255 Minn. 134,
96 N.W.2d 9 (1959); Reyburn v. Minnesota State Bd. of Optometry,
247 Minn. 520, 78 N.W.2d 351 (1956); Lee v. Delmont, 228 Minn. 101,
113, 36 N.W.2d 530, 538 (1949) where the court said:
Pure legislative power, which can never be delegated, is the authority to make a complete law--complete as to the time it shall
take effect and as to whom it shall apply-and to determine the

expediency of its enactment. Although discretion to determine
when and upon whom a law shall take effect may not be delegated, the legislature may confer upon a board or commission
a discretionary power to ascertain, under and pursuant to the
law, some fact or circumstance upon which the law by its own
terms makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. The
power to ascertain facts, which automatically brings a law into
operation by virtue of its own terms, is not the power to pass,
modify, or annul a law. If the law furnishes a reasonably
clear policy or standard of action which controls and guides the
administrative officers in ascertaining the operative facts to
which the law applies, so that the law takes effect upon these
facts by the virtue of its own terms, and not according to the
whim or caprice of the administrative officers, the discretionary
power delegated to the board or commissioner is not legislative (footnotes omitted).
34. Considering the above mentioned limitations, it is quite possible that the Attorney General has already made an attempt to wield
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Therefore, whenever the interpretive authority of the Attorney
General or Commissioner of Taxation is called into question, the
outside limit on their authority must be set within the boundaries described above.
This limitation is important in the sales tax context for a
number of reasons. First, it provides a ground for challenging
an administrative interpretation which asserts the taxability of
certain sales. Second, even if the defense of estoppel were made
legislative power. In Op. MINN. ATTY. GEN., July 27, 1967, requested
and followed by the Commissioner, the Attorney General held that purchases made pursuant to suitably evidenced, pre-enactment, fixed price
or lump sum construction contracts which had no provision for allocation of future taxes would not be subject to the sales tax if made
within one year of its enactment. The Attorney General held that since
transitional contracts received no mention in the Act, and since MINN.
STAT. § 645.21 (1967) required that "[n]o law shall be construed to be
retroactive unless clearly and manifestly so intended by the legislature,"
the sales tax could only be given a prospective effect. In reply to
the argument that taxation of such purchases would not be a retroactive
application since the purchases would not take place until after the effective date of the tax, he stated that the contractors' liability to pay a sales
tax on purchases made pursuant to such pre-enactment contracts became
fixed at the date of enactment regardless of when the taxable event
was to take place.
While it was not an abuse of his interpretive powers to hold that
the tax was not intended to have a retroactive effect, the same cannot
be said for the limitation of its prospective effect to a narrow class of
contracts, and the arbitrary grant of a mere ten month moratorium as
to those contracts. If the taxation of purchases made pursuant to such
pre-enactment construction contracts would be a retroactive application of the tax, then the same reasoning should apply to any preenactment contracts. It would not be any less retroactive merely because the contract was cost-plus or had a provision allocating future
taxes since such provisions merely reach the issue of who will pay the
retroactive tax. While it is true that the opinion aided that class of
persons who would be most injured by a retroactive application, it is
also clear that he decided a question of expediency as to when and
upon whom the tax should take effect; to do so it became necessary to
assume a power which the legislature could not have constitutionally
delegated to him. See Lee v. Delmont, 228 Minn. 101, 36 N.W.2d 530
(1949). Contrary to what many states have done, CAL. REv. & TAX.
CODE § 6376 (West Supp. 1967); D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-2605(k) (1961);
GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3403a (c) (e) (Supp. 1967); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 63-3622(h)&(i) (Supp. 1967); Ky. REv. STAT. AwN. § 139.470(3)
(1963); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 205.94(a)&(b) (1967); NEv. REv. STAT.
§ 372.310 (1967); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54.32B-5(d) (Supp. 1967); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-203(c)1-2 (1964); S.D. CODE § 57.3202(3)
(Supp. 1960); TEx. TAx-GEN. ANN. art. 20.04(H) (Supp. 1967); VA.
CODE ANN. § 58-441.6(b) (Supp. 1968); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 77.54(6)
(Supp. 1967); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 39-335.7 (Supp. 1967), the Minnesota
Legislature chose not to include such a limited transitional exemption in
the sales tax, and it is not within the powers of the Attorney General or
the Commissioner of Taxation to do so administratively.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:583

available against the state in sales tax cases, 5 the seller would
still have to show that his reliance on the official interpretation
was reasonable.8 6 An unsympathetic court might easily find that
reliance on an interpretation which constituted an exercise of
pure legislative power was not reasonable. Third, the limitation
might render unnecessary the words "not inconsistent with its
provisions" 37 in the Commissioner's grant of authority to promulgate sales tax rules and regulations.8 8 There is a significant difference between an administrative official's reasonable mistake
in interpreting an ambiguous exemption and the case where his
ruling clearly contradicts an express command of the statute.
An example of the latter would be a statement that the sales tax
rate is two rather than three per cent.8 9 A seller's reliance on the
first type warrants protection while reliance on the second type
40
does not. If the words "not inconsistent with its provisions"
were intended to protect the state from a ruling of the second
type, they could be legislatively stricken since the limitation discussed in this section seems to cover such instances. Thus, a real
protection of a seller's reasonable reliance would be substituted
41
for the present illusory one.
4. Effect of Attorney General Opinions on the Courts
When interpreting statutes, courts are willing to give opinions of the Attorney General careful consideration, 42 and even
great weight when accompanied by longstanding administrative
44
reliance.43 In no event, however, are they considered binding.
35. Of course, if the defense of estoppel is not made available to
the retailer, the reasonableness of his reliance will be irrelevant since
the courts will not even reach that issue.
36. E.g., Grier v. Estate of Grier, 252 Minn. 143, 89 N.W.2d 398
(1958); Roberts v. Friedell, 218 Minn. 88, 15 N.W.2d 496 (1944).
37. MlN. STAT. § 297A.29 (1967).
38. Id.
39. Id. § 297A.02.
40. Id. § 297A.29.
41. See notes 17-22 supra, and accompanying text.
42. E.g., Leddy v. Cornell, 52 Colo. 189, 120 P. 153 (1912);
Brundage v. Peters, 305 Ill. 223, 137 N.E. 118 (1922); Crown Concrete
Co. v. Conkling, 277

Iowa 609, 75 N.W.2d 351 (1956); Village of Blaine v.

Independent School Dist. No. 12, 272 Minn. 343, 138 N.W.2d 32 (1965);
Kerby v. Collin County, 212 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
43. E.g., Carter v. Commission of Qualification of Judicial Appointments, 14 Cal. 2d 179, 93 P.2d 140 (1939); Mitchell v. Register of
Wills, 227 Md. 305, 176 A.2d 763 (1962) (holding that even though
opinions of the Attorney General are no' binding on a court, an administrative construction by Attorneys General for over 25 years was a
persuasive influence in construing a statute-the court ultimately agreed
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In Lindquist v. Abbett, 45 the

Iinnesota Supreme Court held
that even where a statute said an Attorney General's opinion shall
be binding until overruled, it did not mean to foreclose judicial
construction of the law. The court said that while the statute
may protect persons acting under the opinion from charges of
breach of duty, it could not preclude a court from correctly inter46
preting the law and applying it to such persons.
While the courts appear to give great weight to those opinions with which they agree, they have no qualms about disregarding those with which they disagree. No case has been found
in which a court rejected an opinion of the Attorney General and
at the same time gave its own interpretation only prospective effect. Thus, if the defense of estoppel, based upon reliance on an
Attorney General's opinion, cannot be asserted against the state
with such opinions); Governmental Research Bureau v. St. Louis County,
258 Minn. 350, 104 N.W.2d 411 (1960) (holding for a defendant who had
relied on an Attorney General's opinion and a long-standing administrative practice); Otter Tail Power Co. v. Elbow Lake, 234 Minn. 419, 49
N.W.2d 197 (1951) (holding that the Attorney General's construction of a
statute which was acted on for many years was entitled to considerable
weight); Mattson v. Flynn, 216 Minn. 354, 13 N.W.2d 211 (1944) (construed the law as opposite an Attorney General's opinion even though accompanied by long-standing administrative reliance); Eelkema v. Board
of Educ., 215 Minn. 590, 11 N.W.2d 76 (1943) (accepted the Attorney
General's construction of a statute because subsequent to his opinion
the legislature had re-enacted the statute in its identical language);
Jones v. Williams, 121 Tex. 94, 45 S.W.2d 130 (1931).
44. E.g., Mattson v. Flynn, 216 Minn. 354, 13 N.W.2d 211 (1944);
Lindquist v. Abbett, 196 Minn. 233, 265 N.W. 54 (1936); State ex rel.
Hilton v. Seward, 157 Minn. 263, 196 N.W. 467 (1924).
45. 196 Minn. 233,265 N.W. 54 (1936).
46. Id. at 235-36, 265 N.W. at 55. Plaintiffs had relied on an Attorney General's opinion and cited MASON'S MINN. STAT. § 2848 (1927)
which read:
If any difference of opinion arises between school officers ...
the state's superintendent, at the request of any such officer,
shall submit such question to the attorney general... and such
opinion shall be binding until annulled or overruled by a court.
The court said that a short answer to the plaintiffs' contention would be
that the opinions relied on were not requested by the state superintendent of education, but it chose to go further and determine what effect
§ 2848 would have had on the case if applicable:
...

opinions of the attorney general have great weight, not

only because of their origin, but also because of their effect as a

practical construction where a statute is involved .

.

. it was

certainly not the intention of the legislature to confer upon the
attorney general, an executive officer, the legislative duty of
making law or the judicial function of interpreting it. Hence,
aside from whatever effect an opinion of the attorney general,
procured pursuant to section 2848, may have as protection for
officers acting under it, it can never have the effect of foreclosing, as against judicial action, a question of statutory construction.
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when it attempts to collect a back sales tax, sellers will simply
have to hope that the courts will ultimately agree with the Attorney General. This reliance problem, caused by the inability to
predict the weight a court will eventually give an Attorney General's opinion, is enlarged by the fact that in two instances the
Commissioner of Taxation is bound by the Attorney General's
opinions 4 7 when promulgating rules and regulations on the sales
tax.48 In these two instances, both the likelihood and the reasonableness of reliance by sellers is increased, thereby making a
denial of estoppel even more glaringly inequitable.
In light of the inadequacy of the present situation, it is necessary to examine the possibility of estopping the state from collecting past sales taxes. Since Minnesota's sales tax is a recent
enactment, there are no Minnesota cases on the availability of the
defense of estoppel against the state in the sales tax area. It will
therefore be necessary to examine the general availability of the
defense against the state in Minnesota and to make analogies to
the sales tax. While these cases are helpful in predicting whether
the state can be estopped in this area, they should not be considered determinative because of the special problem created by
the sales tax. The case law of states which have ruled on the
issue will also be examined with a view towards finding the best
approach to the problem.

B.

ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE STATE

The general rule in Minnesota is that the state is subject to
the law of estoppel when it acts in a contractual49 or proprietary
capacity. 0 Conversely, when it acts in its sovereign or governmental capacity 51 it is generally not subject to estoppel, and
47. MUN. STAT. §§ 8.07 & 270.09 (1967).
48. Id. § 297A.29.
49. Youngstown Mines v. Prout, 266 Minn. 450, 124 N.W.2d 328

(1963) (state estopped from denying the power to make a certain lease);
State v. Gardiner, 181 Minn. 513, 233 N.W. 16 (1930) (state estopped
from challenging 11 year old settlement on a timber lease even though
the official making the settlement had no authority to do so); State v.
Horr, 165 Minn. 1, 205 N.W. 444 (1925) (state estopped from collecting
amount compromised on a timber lease even though it received and
held the lands in its sovereign capacity).
50. Spratt v. Hatfield, 267 Minn. 535, 127 N.W.2d 545 (1964);
Youngstown Mines Corp. v. Prout, 266 Minn. 450, 124 N.W.2d 328
(1963); Board of Educ. v. Sand, 227 Minn. 202, 34 N.W.2d 689 (1948);
State v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 200 Minn. 583, 274 N.W. 828 (1937); State
v. Gardiner, 181 Mii. 513, 233 N.W. 16 (1930); State v. Horr, 165 Minn.
1,205 N.W.444 (1925).
51. Spratt v. Hatfield, 267 Minn. 535, 127 N.W.2d 545 (1964);
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when the state exercises its taxing power it acts in its sovereign
capacity.52 Thus, in the non-sales tax context, the Minnesota
courts have held that the state cannot be estopped from collecting a tax either because of the failure of its officials to bring an
action to collect it,53 because its officials have made a mistaken
computation, 54 because the Commissioner of Taxation changed a
long standing method of computing a tax,5 5 or because of reliance
on the ruling of a former Commissioner that certain expenses
were deductible.5 6
In contrast, State ex rel. Douglas v. School District Number 10857 held that the state was estopped from denying the
proper incorporation of a school district because its officials had
dealt with it as properly organized and had accepted its bonds.
While this is not a tax case, it seems clear that the state is
operating in its sovereign capacity when incorporating school
districts. 8 This case has never been expressly overruled, and
two of the Minnesota Supreme Court's more recent decisions on
estoppel against the state have stated the following rule:
While the state and its political subdivisions may be estopped in
certain cases the same as an individual, the application of
estoppel is strictly limited to purely proprietary matters and
generally is not applied to matters involving questions of gov59
ernmental power or the exercise thereof.

The court thus left itself free to allow the defense of estoppel
Youngstown Mines Corp. v. Prout, 266 Minn. 450, 124 N.W.2d 328 (1963);
Board of Educ. v. Sand, 227 Minn. 202, 34 N.W.2d 689 (1948); State v.
Illinois Cent. R.R., 200 Minn. 583, 274 N.W. 828 (1937); State v. Brooks,
183 Minn. 251, 236 N.W. 316 (1931); State v. Gardiner, 181 Minn. 513,
233 N.W. 16 (1930); State v. Horr, 165 Minn. 1, 205 N.W. 444 (1925).
52. Spratt v. Hatfield, 267 Minn. 535, 539, 127 N.W.2d 545, 548
(1964): "In the levy and imposition of taxes, the state acts in its
sovereign capacity, and hence .

.

. cannot be subjected to an equitable

estoppel." See State v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 200 Minn. 583, 274 N.W. 828
(1937); State v. Brooks, 183 Minn. 251, 236 N.W. 316 (1931); State v.
Horr, 165 Minn. 1, 205 N.W. 444 (1925).
53. State v. Brooks, 183 Minn. 251, 254, 236 N.W. 316, 317 (1931)
(inheritance tax):
The delay [13 years] of the state for so long a time in bringing
the suit is no defense. The collection of taxes is a governmental or sovereign function of the state, and procrastination
or delay on the part of its officers in the discharge of such function is not permitted to prejudice the state's rights.
54. State v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 200 Minn. 583, 274 N.W. 828 (1937).
55. Spratt v. Hatfield, 267 Minn. 535, 127 N.W.2d 545 (1964).
56. In re Abbott's Estate, 213 Minn. 289, 6 N.W.2d 466 (1942).
57. 85 Minn. 230, 88N.W. 751 (1902).
58. Cf. Board of Educ. v. Sand, 227 Minn. 202, 34 N.W.2d 689
(1948).
59. Spratt v. Hatfield, 267 Minn. 535, 538, 127 N.W.2d 545, 548
(1964); Board of Educ. v. Sand, 227 Minn. 202, 211, 34 N.W.2d 689
(1948).
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against the state acting in its sovereign capacity. This is entirely
consistent with the pronouncement of an earlier Minnesota case
to the effect that it is neither necessary nor desirable to make a
concrete statement in advance as to when the defense of estoppel
is available against the state, since it is far better to have each
case controlled by its own facts.60

C. ESTOPPEL 3N SALES TAX CASES OUTSIE MNNESOTA
It has been held that the mere failure of a tax official to issue
a ruling or regulation asserting liability, or to attempt to collect a
sales tax, will not estop the state from later doing so61 even when
the seller had actively attempted to obtain a ruling.6 2 It has also
been held that reliance on the informal or unauthorized opinion
of an administrative official is not grounds for estopping the state
from collecting a back sales tax,63 even when the official twice
60. State v. Horr, 165 Minn. 1, 6, 205 N.W. 444, 445-46 (1925):
The courts hold that this defense applies to the state "in a proper
case" without making a more concrete declaration. "What is a
proper case no court seems yet to have attempted to define.
." Nor is there any necessity for any such attempt. It is far
better that each case be controlled by its own facts.
61. Merriwether v. State, 252 Ala. 590, 42 So. 2d 465 (1949) (nine
year failure to promulgate any regulation asserting the taxability of certain sales did not estop the state from collecting back taxes); A.H.
Benoit & Co. v. Johnson, 160 Me. 201, 202 A.2d 1 (1964) (failure of
administrative officials to attempt to collect a sales tax on certain sales
did not estop the state from collecting it within the time limitations of
the act-12 year acquiescence); Rockower Bros. v. Comptroller of
Treasury, 240 Md. 379, 214 A.2d 581 (1965) (the fact that the comptroller knowingly accepted sales tax returns and payments from agent
of vendor did not estop him from later asserting the vendor's liability
for taxes collected by the agent but not remitted to the state); Comptroller of Treasury v. Atlas Gen. Indus., 234 Md. 77, 198 A.2d 86 (1964)
(failure of previous administrations to collect a sales tax on certain
sales did not estop a subsequent one from collecting back taxes);
Wasem's, Inc. v. State, 63 Wash. 2d 67, 385 P.2d 530 (1963) (failure of
commissioner to rule on plaintiff's tax avoidance plan after repeated
requests did not estop him from later ruling that it was unsuccessful
and collecting a sales tax on sales made pursuant to the plan).
62. Wasem's, Inc. v. State, 63 Wash. 2d 67, 70, 385 P.2d 530, 531
(1963). Appellant contended that even if its plan for avoiding a tax
on sales to nonresidents was ineffective, the tax commissioner was estopped from collecting back taxes by his failure so to rule after repeated
requests for a ruling. The court said:
While it is likely and understandable that the continuing inaction on the part of the Tax Commission may have been frustrating for appellant's officers; nevertheless, the courts must be,
and are, most reluctant to find an estoppel where the State is
acting in its taxing capacity ....

(emphasis added).

63. E.g., C.E. Weaver Co. v. Comptroller of Treasury, 235 Md. 15,
200 A.2d 53 (1964). Advice that certain sales were not subject to the
sales tax had been obtained by plaintiff's accountant in an informal
conversation with an employee of the department of taxation who had
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refused to issue the seller a sales
tax certificate which would
64
have allowed him to collect a tax.
Although no cases have been found which estopped the state
from collecting back sales taxes when sellers relied on administrative inaction or informal and unauthorized legal opinions, the
courts are more sympathetic to sellers who reasonably relied on
authorized rules and regulations of the state's tax department. 65
6
In Hoffman v. City of Syracuse"
the plaintiffs had relied on an
erroneous regulation of the Commissioner in computing the sales
tax on their liquor sales. The court held that the city was estopped from claiming an additional tax on past sales. But even in
such a jurisdiction, the state cannot be estopped by reliance on an
official ruling which the seller has merely misinterpreted.6 7 Although reasonable and detrimental reliance on an official ruling

been expressly ordered not to give legal opinions. It had earlier been
held in Comptroller of Treasury v. Atlas Gen. Indus., 234 Md. 77, 198
A.2d 86 (1964), that the state could not be estopped from collecting
back sales taxes by the actions of its agents; but even if the defense had
been available it seems unlikely that this would have been reasonable
reliance.
64. Claiborne Sales Co. v. Collector of Revenue, 233 La. 1061,
99 So. 2d 345 (1957). Although this seems a harsh result, it is undesirable for a state to have its valuable tax rights frittered away by unauthorized employees. A rule which would allow estoppel based upon
official rules and regulations of the commissioner of taxation would
offer the retailer a means of protection by applying for a ruling on
his particular case, while still offering a fair degree of protection to the
state.
65. See Wasem's, Inc. v. State, 63 Wash. 2d 67, 69, 385 P.2d 530,
531 (1963), where the court held that administrative inaction could not
estop the state from collecting back sales taxes, but the court would not
rule out the possibility that the published rules of the commission
might: "We need not consider whether the published rules of the Commission could work an estoppel in a proper case, because the plan put
into effect by the appellant does not qualify for the exemption or deduction provided in Rule 193."
66. 2 N.Y.2d 484, 491, 141 N.E.2d 605, 609 (1957):
And it hardly needs statement that the city is not entitled to
hold the liquor dealers liable for the higher sales tax which
they could have charged and collected, had the commissioner
not directed a contrary course during that period. Since ...
the vendors were actually prohibited from charging their
customers a sales tax based on inclusion of the excise taxes, it
would be unthinkable to hold them responsible for the larger
amounts they would have collected had they, contrary to the
city's direction, included excise taxes .... In other words, since
the city required plaintiffs to charge and collect sales taxes on
the selling price of the liquor, less excise taxes, between 1952
and October 1, 1955, it would be estopped from asserting any
claim for additional taxes that might otherwise have accrued
against them during that period.
67. Cf. Michigan Sportservice, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue,
319 Mich. 561, 30 N.W.2d 281 (1948); Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v.
Joseph, 308 N.Y. 333, 341-42, 125 N.E.2d 857, 861 (1955).
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or regulation has not led to similar results in all or even many
jurisdictions,6" it has made the denial of the defense's availability more difficult for the courts that have faced it. 69
Ohio is an example of a state which has been unwilling to
treat the issue of reliance in sales tax cases the same way as reliance in other types of tax cases. In Recording Devices Incorporated v. Bowers,70 the court held that even though certain leases
were subject to the sales tax, the state could not hold a lessor
liable for a sales tax on leases executed prior to the written rescission of a long-standing tax department letter establishing their
nontaxability. The court said the state could not be estopped and
that it was merely giving persuasive weight to a long-standing
administrative practice. 71 But in order for the court to aid the
68. E.g., Duhame v. State Tax Con~m'n, 65 Ariz. 268, 179 P.2d 252
(1947); Market St. Ry. v. California State Bd. of Equalization, 137
Cal. App. 2d 87, 290 P.2d 20 (1955); Henderson v. Gill, 229 N.C. 313,
49 S.E.2d 754 (1948).
69. Henderson v. Gill, 229 N.C. 313, 316, 49 S.E.2d 754, 756 (1948),
where the court said:
The case of plaintiffs has an appeal stronger than that which
usually supports a plea of estoppel. The official representations
made to them are now conceded to have been incorrect and misleading and because of the multitude of the transactions and
want of any record of the purchasers they were thus deprived of
the opportunity to collect the three per cent tax on sales made
on products they were advised were exempt. Moreover, it
must be noted that these plaintiff merchants were statutory
agents for the collection of the tax on sales which were definitely imposed upon the consumer, and their responsibility
arises on the assumption that they must so collect.
Nevertheless, the court concluded that since the state was exercising a
sovereign right, it could not be estopped even under these circumstances.
It felt that even though the result might seem unjust, it was the majority rule and was considered necessary to prevent chaotic and endless
disputes in the collection of taxes.
70. 174 Ohio 518, 190 N.E.2d 258 (1963). Even though the court
canceled the Commissioner's assessment, it did rule that the leases in
question were taxable under the statute.
71. Id. at 520, 190 N.E.2d at 260, where the court said:
. we are of the opinion that, although the equitable principle
of estoppel cannot operate against the state of Ohio, and that the
Tax Commissioner cannot be bound in all cases by acts or opinions of employees, yet where a long-established practice has
been followed, such administrative practice does have much
persuasive weight especially where the practice has gone on
unchallenged for a quarter of a century [actually 21.5 years].
72. Lutheran Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 117 Ohio App. 9, 11,
189 N.E.2d 449, 450 (1962) where the court said:
Considerable stress also is laid upcn supposed estoppel which
arises due to the fact that the Superintendent of Insurance from
1938 to 1954 acquiesced in the nonpayment of the total amount
due, and it is even claimed that this was knowingly done by the
various occupants of the office, beginning in 1938. The law is
clearly settled in cases such as this that no estoppel can be
recognized nor may it be asserted against the state of Ohio. If
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lessor on the theory of giving persuasive weight to a long-standing administrative practice, it would have to construe the act as
being consistent with the administrative practice. Thus, since
the court actually construed the act contrary to the tax department letter, it clearly reached an estoppel result when it protected the lessor's reliance. Similar long-standing administrative
practices in Ohio have not aided taxpayers in non-sales tax cases
decided before 72 and after73 Bowers.
The California case of La Socidt6 FrangaiseDe Bienfaisance
Mutuelle v. CaliforniaEmployment Commission74 is also a useful

precedent, even though it is not a sales tax case. Relying on a
formal tax agency ruling that it was not subject to the unemployment tax, the Soci6t6 refunded to its employees the amounts it
had deducted from their pay. Two years later the tax agency
reversed its position and collected the full amount for the two
years plus penalties and interest. The court recognized the general rule that estoppel is not available against the state in tax
matters, but added that under certain circumstances public policy demanded amelioration of the rule's harshness. It held that
the state was estopped from collecting all penalties, interest, and
that portion of the tax which, absent the ruling, would have been
withheld from the employees' salaries. Thus, the Soci~t6 paid no
more of the tax out of its own funds than the statute contemplated. 75 A similar result was reached in another non-sales tax
it were otherwise, public officials for a great variety of reasons
could fritter away valuable tax rights of the state of Ohio.
Even though the court would not recognize an estoppel against the state
in those terms, it could easily have reached the same result by applying the rule of long standing administrative practice promulgated in the
Bowers case a few months later. Apparently the court recognized some
inherent difference-between a sales tax and a tax meant to be borne
by the taxpayer-which makes a certain result just in one case
and unjust in the other.
73. See Interstate Motor Freight System v. Donahue, 8 Ohio 2d
19, 221 N.E.2d 711 (1966).
74. 56 Cal. App. 2d 534, 133 P.2d 47 (1943).
75. Id. at 552, 133 P.2d at 56:
As to such part of the tax, the burden of which the act contemplates will be borne by the employees . . . we are of the
view that the state may not belatedly hold the employer to
payment where he has failed to pay, or to make the necessary
deductions from his employees' wages, in reliance on an express
ruling that he is not liable for the tax. As between the state
and the employer, the state may not in good conscience thus
place on the employer a burden which the act itself did not
intend that he should bear. We are further of the view that the
employer cannot be held to pay interest on contributions which
were not paid when due solely in reliance on the official ruling
of nonliability. On the other hand, the state should not lose its
right to taxes which the employer should have paid from its
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case761 where the person required to remit the tax was not the
person upon whom the burden of the tax was intended to fall.
In Market Street Railway v. CaliforniaState Board of Equalization,7 7 the court recognized but limited the principles of La
Soci~t6.7 8

It said that reliance on an official ruling could not

estop the state from collecting a back tax which the legislature
intended the complaining taxpayer to bear, but that the state
could be estopped if the complainant were merely a collecting
agent for the state.7 9 The court went on, however, to hold that
the state could not be estopped from collecting the California
sales tax since it was imposed on the seller for the privilege of
selling at retail with the mere option to pass it on to the purchaser.8 0 This result is unduly restrictive since La Soci~td did
own funds to discharge its own tax obligation. That is, the
state is entitled to retain that portion of the tax collected under
protest which represents the plaintiff's contribution as employer, notwithstanding that plaintiff failed to make payment
when due in reliance on the erroneous ruling of non-liability.
76. Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 55 Pa. D. & C.
343, 358 (Philadelphia County Ct. 1945) where the court said:
With respect to the taxes that defendant did not collect at the
source prior to July 12, 1945, when the present regulation went
into effect, we think it is clear that the plaintiff is not entitled to
an accounting. Whether or not -the former regulation was
within the scope of the regulatory power given to him by the
ordinance, the fact is that he did promulgate it under color of
an assumed authority, and by doing so he expressly invited defendant and similarly situated employers not to deduct and
return the tax. When, therefore, in reliance upon what
amounted to an official instruction not to collect it, defendant in
good faith paid its employees their full wages without deducting the tax, obvious principles of estoppel prevent the city
from demanding that defendant pay the amount of the tax a
second time to it. As to those taxes the action of defendant in
paying them over to the employes who earned them as part of
their wages was induced by the receiver of taxes, and the city
cannot justly complain that defendant obeyed the instructions to
the effect of its own official.
77. 137 Cal. App. 2d 87, 290 P.2d 20 (1955).
78. Id. at 100-01, 290 P.2d at 28-29, where the court said:
The state board cites many cases from this and other jurisdictions to the effect that an estoppel based on reliance upon an
erroneous construction of the statute by an administrative
ruling will not lie against the government, particularly in tax
matters. As a general proposition tirs is sound law. Obviously,
a tax administrator should not be permitted by an erroneous
ruling to exempt a taxpayer from the obligation to pay taxes.
But that is as far as the rule goes. The proper limitations on
that rule were pointed out by this court in La Societe ....
79. Id. at 103, 290 P.2d at 30. Contra, Henderson v. Gill, 229
N.C. 313, 49 S.E.2d 754, (1948) (state could not be estopped from collecting a back sales tax even though the seller was merely a collecting
agent for the state).
80. Market St. Ry. v. California State Bd. of Equalization, 137 Cal.
App. 2d 87, 103, 290 P.2d 20, 30 (1955). CAL. Rnv. & TAx. CoDE § 6051

19691

MINNESOTA SALES TAX

not turn on whether the Soci~t6 was deemed a taxpayer or a collecting agent, but rather on how much of the tax the legislature
intended the Soci6t6 to bear out of its own funds."' While it is
true that the California sales tax is imposed on the retailer for
the privilege of selling at retail,8 2 there are numerous provisions
in the act which imply that the legislature did not intend the
retailer to pay the tax out of his own funds. 83 But despite its
restrictive effect on the holding of La Socigtg, the Market Street
court did estop the state from collecting penalties for late payment caused by the reliance.8 4

III. THE RELIANCE PROBLEM IN MINNESOTA
When the legislature
person required to remit
the defense of estoppel as
ment, and it is unlikely

intends a tax to be borne solely by the
it, it is not unreasonable to deny him
long as he is not penalized for late paythat a Minnesota taxpayer would be

(Supp. 1967): 'For the privilege of selling tangible personal property
at retail a tax is hereby imposed upon all retailers ... ." § 6052: "The
tax hereby imposed shall be collected by the retailer from the consumer
in so far as it can be done." The Code Commission Notes after § 6052
provide: "This section merely allows a retailer to reimburse himself
for payment of the tax. He is limited in so doing where the consumer's
contractual or constitutional rights are infringed." In Clary v. Basalt
Rock Co., 99 Cal. App. 2d 458, 222 P.2d 24 (1950), the court said that
the provision in the sales tax act that the tax shall be collected by the
retailer from the consumer did not give the retailer a right of action
against the consumer unless the consumer had agreed to pay the tax
and failed to do so. Thus, when the retailer and consumer had agreed
on a price and said nothing about a sales tax there was no implied
obligation on the part of the consumer to pay the tax in addition to the
agreed price.
81. La Soci6t6 Frangaise De Bienfaisance Mutuelle v. California
Employment Comm'n, 56 Cal. App. 2d 534, 555, 133 P.2d 47, 57 (1943)
where the court said:
It is our view that in the present case a proper regard for the
protection of the interests of the government in its revenues,
with recognition also of a degree of responsibility on the part of
the government to a taxpayer who has relied to his prejudice
on an official ruling, is achieved by requiring the taxpayer to
discharge that part of the tax burden which it was contemplated it should bear by the statute imposing the tax, while
relieving it from liability for employees' contributions and interest on delayed payments. The taxpayer will pay from his
own funds as much as it would have paid originally but for the
erroneous administrative ruling, but it will not pay more.
82. CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE § 6051 (Supp. 1967).
83. CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE § 6052 (1956) (authorization to collect
from the consumer); CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE § 6053 (1956) (it is a misdeameanor to advertise, state, or hold out to the public or any customer
that any part of the sales tax will be absorbed, assumed or refunded).
84. Market St. Ry. v. California State Bd. of Equalization, 137 Cal.
App. 2d 87, 106, 290 P.2d 20, 30 (1955).
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penalized for a late payment caused by reasonable reliance on an
official administrative interpretation. 85 Such a taxpayer could
not seriously claim to have been substantially prejudiced by a
subsequent order to pay a back tax. In fact, his position may
have been improved by the erroneous interpretation, since he will
have received an interest-free loan from the state if he is not required to pay interest on the late payment. In the sales tax context, however, the retailer will not find himself in such a beneficial position if he is forced to pay a back tax. Despite the fact
that he will not be penalized for late payment, he will have to
pay the tax out of his own funds since the opportunity to collect from his purchasers will have passed.
80
Although the Minnesota statute, unlike some sales tax acts,
does not explicitly deny any intent to have the seller bear the
incidence of the tax, a number of its provisions do implicitly deny
any such intent. Despite the fact that one provision imposes the
sales tax on the retail seller's gross receipts,87 other provisions
imply that the tax is actually imposed on the consumer, and is
merely measured by the seller's gross receipts and collected by
him for administrative convenience. 88 The amount the seller is
required to remit can never exceed the amount "he is authorized
and required by law to collect from the purchaser."8 9 Also, if the
seller takes an exemption certificate from a purchaser, he is relieved of the duty of collecting and remitting the tax to the
state.9 0 If the tax were intended to be borne by the seller, it is
85. See In re Estate of Abbott, 213 Minn. 289, 296, 6 N.W.2d 466,
470 (1942):

In view of the fact that decedent justifiably relied upon the
ruling of a former tax commissioner that like expenditures
were deductible, we believe that it would be unjust and inequitable to enforce the payment of penalties and that they should
be abated.
Lindquist v. Abbett, 196 Minn. 233, 265 N.W. 54 (1936); MINN. STAT.
§ 297A.39 (1967):
The commissioner shall have the power to abate penalties when
in his opinion their enforcement would be unjust and inequitable. The exercise of this power shall be subject to the approval of the attorney general.
86. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105.164.7 (1965):
It is the purpose and intent of this article that the tax herein
levied and imposed shall be added to the sales price of tangible
personal property when sold at retail and thereby be borne and
passed on to the customer, instead ol being borne by the retailer.
87. MAiN. STAT. § 297A.02 (1967): "There is hereby imposed an
excise tax of three percent of the gross receipts of any person from
sales at retail, as hereinbefore defined, made in this state after July 31,
1967. ..."
88.

See Id. §§ 297A.02-.03 (2); §§ 297A.09-.10.

89. Id. § 297A.02 (emphasis added).
90. Id. § 297A.10:

"The exemption certificate will conclusively
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unlikely that the legislature would have used this language in
setting limits on his liability. Furthermore, if such had been the
legislature's intent there would have been no reason to require
that the tax be separately stated and charged, to require that it
be collected from the purchaser, or to call it a debt owed by the
purchaser to the sellerY1 Moreover, there certainly would have
been no reason for making it a misdemeanor for the seller to attempt to assume the tax.9 2 The imposition of the sales tax on the
gross receipts of the retailer should be recognized as merely an
administrative necessity for efficient collection, and there should
be no argument that the legislature intended him to bear the
incidence of the tax.93
It would, therefore, be highly inequitable to deny the defense
of estoppel to a retail seller who had not collected a sales tax in
reliance on an official administrative interpretation.
If the interpretation had been correct in the first instance, the purchaser
would have borne the tax; but if it had been erroneous in the first
instance and the seller were denied the defense of estoppel, he
would probably have to pay the tax with his own funds-a result
which the legislature could not have intended.
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

A. UNSATISFACTORY ALTERNATIVES TO ESTOPPEL
In. the absence of estoppel, the alternative methods available to protect a seller against potential back sales tax liability
are generally unsatisfactory. The retailer has no way of knowing whether the Commissioner of Taxation will enter into a liability agreement9 5 in the event that an administrative interprerelieve the retailer from collecting and remitting the tax only if taken
in good faith from a purchaser... (emphasis added)."
91. Id. § 297A.03(1):
The tax shall be stated and charged separately from the sales
price or charge for service and shall be collected by the seller
from the purchaser insofar as practicable and shall be a debt
from the purchaser to the seller recoverable at law in the same
manner as other debts.
92.

Id. § 297A.03 (2).

93. In deciding on whom the legislature intended the burden of the
tax to fall, the courts should not become overly concerned with labels
and automatically conclude that if the retailer cannot be literally
deemed a collecting agent, then the legislature must have intended the
seller to bear the tax. See notes 79-82 supra, and accompanying text.
94. Query whether the retailer could even collect the sales tax on
transactions which the Commissioner had ruled exempt if the courts had
not yet rejected the exception.
95. MmN. STAT. § 297A.36(1) (1967):
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tation is ruled erroneous. While it is true that the retailer could
gain some protection by periodically entering into liability agreements,96 there is no assurance that the Commissioner would
cooperate since the statute fails to establish criteria which would
force him to do S.9
Another equally unsatisfactory solution would be for the
seller to bring a declaratory judgment action 9s contesting the
validity of the exemption granted by the official interpretation.
Even if available, 99 the declaratory judgment action is not an
The commissioner, or any officer or employee of the state tax
department authorized in writing by the commissioner, is authorized to enter into a signed agreement in writing with any

person relating to the liability of such person . . . for any tax
due under sections . . . for any taxable period ending prior to

the date of the agreement.
96. Id.

97. Id.
98. Id. § 555.01:
Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have
power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether
or not further relief is or could be claimed. No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration
may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect; and
such declarations shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree.
99. The purpose of the declaratory judgment act is to provide a
means of clarifying uncertainties and insecurities by settling a person's
rights, status and other legal relations in advance. The statute is to be
liberally construed, MIh=. STAT. § 555.12 (1967), and it is expressly made
available to anyone whose rights, status or other legal relations are
affected by a statute to have such determined under it. MINN. STAT.
§ 555.02 (1967). The court's authority comes into play whenever a decree would terminate a controversy or remove an uncertainty. Mmnx.
STAT. § 555.05 (1967).
Although all these prerequisites seem to be met
by the problem the sales tax causes for the retail seller, there are additional requirements imposed by the courts which may stand in the way
of a declaratory judgment action by the seller.
The courts require a justiciable controversy-an actual controversy
between adversaries who have a tangible legal interest in obtaining a
judgment. Without such tangible legal interests, the case would merely
be an academic one for an advisory opinion and will not be entertained.
Port Authority v. Fisher, 269 Minn. 276, 132 N.W.2d 183 (1964); Hassler
v. Engberg, 233 Minn. 487, 48 N.W.2d 343 (1951); County Bd. of Educ. v.
Borgen, 192 Minn. 512, 257 N.W. 92 (1934). Thus, if the action is not
adversary in nature it will be dismissed as in County Bd. of Educ. v.
Borgen, 192 Minn. 512, 257 N.W. 92 (1934), where defendants sought to
have a decree in favor of plaintiffs affirmed.
There could be a serious question whether an attempt by a retail
seller to have an interpretation exempting certain of his sales declared void is an adversary proceeding. While a valid exemption
would be welcomed by the seller, since it would lessen the expense of
collecting the tax, it is more important to him to have any tax actually
required to be paid collected from the purchaser rather than being paid
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adequate alternative to estoppel. It is unreasonable to expect
a seller to assert in court that all of his sales are subject to
the sales tax. Moreover, few sellers are in a position to avail
themselves of this type of protection. The seller would need a
very high potential back sales tax liability and a high probability
that the interpretation was incorrect in order to justify the time
and expense of bringing such an action. Yet, he would be substantially prejudiced by having to pay a back sales tax out of his
own funds. A relatively inexpensive method must be devised
which protects the seller from this substantial prejudice without
severely threatening the state's interest in guarding its revenues.
The answer is to make available the defense of estoppel.10 0

B.

ESTOPPEL AS A JUDICIAL SOLUTION

Estoppel is the only adequate judicial solution to the special
reliance problem created by the sales tax. It is a flexible doctrine1 01 founded in justice, good conscience and fair dealing,
which has as its object the prevention of injury caused by the
assertion of a state of facts inconsistent with those represented
from his own funds. Thus, it is in his own interest to attack the interpretation with the utmost vigor since if it survives a strong court attack
he could feel relatively safe in relying on it, and if it is declared void he
avoids the risk of a back sales tax liability.
One further hurdle to the availability of the declaratory judgment
action remains. In State ex rel. Smith v. Haveland, 223 lMinn. 89, 25
N.W.2d 474 (1946), the court held that the plaintiff could not challenge
the constitutionality of a statute exempting him from the money and
credits tax since the right to pay a tax was not a protectible legal interest. But in Arens v. Village of Rogers, 240 Minn. 386, 393, 61 N.W.2d 508,
514 (1953), the court said the plaintiff's interest in Haveland was merely
an academic one as to whether the particular exemption was constitutionally feasible. In the sales tax context the retail seller would have
an interest in need of protection-the right to collect from the purchaser
any sales tax which he is required to remit to the state. AI=. STAT.
§ 297A.03 (1) (1967). He would not be seeking mere information or the
opinion of the court. He would be seeking a final determination of his
rights and obligations under the sales tax. See County Bd. of Educ. v.
Borgen, 192 Minn. 512, 518, 257 N.W. 92, 95 (1934), where the court
said:
The court must merely be alert to distinguish the fictitious or
collusive suit, where only information or opinion is sought, from
those in which rights are placed in issue with the purpose of a
binding determination.
100. The declaratory judgment could be of value, however, in determining the validity of administrative interpretations which are so
suspect that it may be unreasonable to rely on them. See notes
35 & 36 supra, and accompanying text. With the number of declaratory
judgments necessary being thus limited, the expense would no longer
be totally prohibitive.
101. E.g., Frye v. Anderson, 248 Minn. 478, 494, 80 N.W.2d 593, 603
(1957); Roberts v. Friedell, 218 Minn. 88, 96, 15 N.W.2d 496, 500 (1944).
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and relied upon. 10 2 The application of estoppel against the state
in the sales tax context can be supported by the doctrine that
when one of two innocent persons must suffer from the act of
another, it should be he who made the third person's act pos10 3
sible.
While it is readily admitted that the state has a valid interest
in protecting its revenues, a court merely turns its back on the
sales tax problem when it enunciates a black letter rule that
estoppel is not available against the state when exercising its
taxing authority. If a court did make estoppel available against
the state in sales tax cases, it could both avoid substantial prejudice to the retailer and protect the state's interest. 0 4 The
state's interest is protected because the retailer, in order to prevail on the defense, would have to make out a valid case of estoppel10 5 In cases involving administrative inaction' 0 6 or casual
102. E.g., Poksyla v. Sundholm, 259 Minn. 125, 127, 106 N.W.2d
202, 204 (1960); Village of Wells v. Layne-Minnesota Co., 240 Minn. 132,
141, 60 N.W.2d 621, 627 (1953); Roberts v. Friedell, 218 Minn. 88, 96,
15 N.W.2d 496, 500 (1944).
103. See, e.g., Nehring v. Bast, 258 Minn. 193, 202, 103 N.W.2d 368,
375 (1960): "It is well recognized that 'whenever one of two innocent
persons must suffer by the act of a third, he who by his conduct, act, or
omission has enabled such third person to occasion the loss must sustain
it' "; Frye v. Anderson, 248 Minn. 478, 494, 80 N.W.2d 593, 603 (1957);
Hernland v. Town & Country Motors, Inc., 159 Minn. 125, 127, 198
N.W. 662, 662 (1924); Burgess v. Bragow, 49 Minn. 462, 468, 52 N.W. 45,
46 (1892): "The plaintiff also stands within the rule that where one of
two innocent persons must suffer from the fraudulent act of a third, he
by whose act the third person was enabled to perpetrate the fraud must
bear the loss."
104. New York serves as an example. In Hoffman v. City of Syracuse, 2 N.Y.2d 484, 141 N.E.2d 605 (1957), the court held that the city
was estopped by a sales tax regulation from collecting a back sales tax.
In Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. Joseph, 308 N.Y. 333, 125 N.E.2d 857
(1955), the court would not allow the petitioner to estop the state from
collecting a back sales tax because the regulation relied on did not
cover the situation at bar and thus the petitioner had failed to show the
reasonable reliance necessary to make out a valid case of estoppel.
105. To establish a valid case of estoppel it would not be necessary
to prove any actual intent to mislead, e.g., Browning v. Browning, 246
Minn. 327, 331, 76 N.W.2d 100, 103 (1956); Macomber v. Kinney, 114
Minn. 146, 154, 128 N.W. 1001, 1003 (1910); Beebe v. Wilkinson, 30
Minn. 548, 549-50, 16 N.W. 450, 451 (1883), but it would be necessary to
show a representation of fact rather than mere opinion, Bremer v. Commissioner of Tax., 246 Minn. 446, 454-55, 75 N.W.2d 470, 475 (1956), and
circumstances indicating that it was natural and probable that it would
be acted upon. E.g., Browning v. Browning, 246 Minn. 327, 331, 76
N.W.2d 100, 103 (1956); Macomber v. Kinney, 114 Minn. 146, 154, 128
N.W. 1001, 1003 (1910). In order to estop the state on the ground of
acquiescence in a course of conduct of the tax department, it would be
necessary to show that under the circumstances the department had a
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or unauthorized advice of tax department employees, 0 7 the reduty to speak or act. See Browning v. Browning, 246 Minn. 327, 331,
76 N.W.2d 100, 103 (1956); Village of Wells v. Layne-Minnesota Co.,
240 Minn. 132, 141, 60 N.W.2d 621, 627 (1953); Macomber v. Kinney,
114 Minn. 146, 154, 128 N.W. 1001, 1003 (1910). It would also be necessary to show reasonable and good faith reliance on the representation
and the fact that the party would be injured if the state were not estopped from denying the representation. E.g., Niaze v. St. Paul Mercury
Ins. Co., 265 Minn. 222, 228 n.5, 121 N.W.2d 349, 354 n.5 (1963); Grier v.
Estate of Grier, 252 Minn. 143, 150, 89 N.W.2d 398, 404 (1958); Roberts v.
Friedell, 218 Minn. 88, 96, 15 N.W.2d 496, 500 (1944); Exsted v. Exsted,
202 Minn. 521, 526, 279 N.W. 554, 558 (1938); Macomber v. Kinney, 114
Minn. 146, 154-55, 128 N.W. 1001, 1003 (1910).
The Minnesota court has also held that the party asserting the estoppel must have been ignorant of the true state of facts, the theory
apparently being that if he possessed equal knowledge of the facts he
could not claim that he had relied on the representation. Froslee v.
Sonju, 209 Minn. 522, 524, 297 N.W. 1, 3 (1941); Darelius v. Commonwealth Mortgage Co., 152 Minn. 128, 136, 188 N.W. 208, 211 (1922);
Macomber v. Kinney, 114 Minn. 146, 154, 128 N.W. 1001, 1003 (1910);
Western Land Ass'n v. Banks, 80 Minn. 317, 320, 83 N.W. 192, 193 (1900).
In addition, the party against whom the estoppel is asserted must
have full knowledge (imputed or actual) of the facts or be negligent in
not having such knowledge, since an estoppel cannot be based on an

innocent mistake caused by ignorance of the facts. Browning v. Brown-

ing, 246 Minn. 327, 331, 76 N.W.2d 100, 103 (1956); Johnson v. Giese, 231
Minn. 258, 265, 42 N.W.2d 712, 716 (1950); Froslee v. Sonju, 209 Minn.
522, 526, 297 N.W. 1, 4 (1941); Macomber v. Kinney, 114 Minn. 146, 154,
128 N.W. 1001, 1003 (1910). Under a literal reading of these decisions a
court could hold that the retail seller had equal knowledge of all the
facts surrounding the sales tax, and thus that he could not make out a
valid case of estoppel even if the defense were available. But such a
result need not be necessary when the reasoning behind the rule
is examined. When a person is completely apprised of the facts

he can make his own independent determination and need not rely on

the representation of another. Under the sales tax, however, the seller
would not be completely free to follow his own determination based
upon his knowledge of the facts because any rule or regulation promulgated by the commissioner of taxation carries with it an apparent force
and effect of law. MNN. STAT. § 297A.29 (1967). See also Philadelphia
v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 55 Pa. D. & C. 343, 358 (1945). In
those states which have estopped the state from collecting a back sales
or similar tax, the courts have not even mentioned the possibility that
the taxpayer had equal knowledge of all the facts. La Soci~t6 Frangaise
De Bienfaisance Mutuelle v. California Employment Comm'n, 56 Cal.
App. 2d 534, 133 P.2d 47 (1943); Hoffman v. City of Syracuse, 2 N.Y.2d
484, 161 N.Y.S.2d 111, 141 N.E.2d 605 (1957); Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 55 Pa. D. & C. 343 (1945).
106. Merriwether v. State, 252 Ala. 590, 42 So. 2d 465 (1949); A.H.
Benoit & Co. v. Johnson, 160 Me. 201, 202 A.2d 1 (1964); Rockower
Bros. v. Comptroller of Treasury, 240 Md. 379, 214 A.2d 581 (1965);
Comptroller of Treasury v. Atlas Gen. Indus., 234 Md. 77, 198 A.2d 86
(1964); Wasem's, Inc. v. State, 63 Wash. 2d 67, 385 P.2d 530 (1963).
107. Claiborne Sales Co. v. Collector of Revenue, 232 La. 1061, 99
So. 2d 345 (1957); C.E. Weaver Co. v. Comptroller of Revenue, 235 Md.

15, 200 A.2d 53 (1964).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:583

taller would usually be unable to make out such a valid case; his
reliance would probably be found unreasonable. The state's interest in guarding its revenues is certainly important enough to
prevent the application of estoppel in cases where there has
been no communication between the retailer and the tax department or where the seller has relied on what is merely the personal opinion 0 8 of a tax department employee. On the other
hand, when the state has authorized certain administrative officials to interpret the sales tax, 0 9 the equities turn to the side of
the retailer.
Thus, the availability of estoppel would have its greatest and
most legitimate impact in cases where the retailer relied on an official rule or regulation of the Commissioner of Taxation" 0 or an
opinion of the Attorney General. In this situation a number of
108. Wagner, Estoppel by Informal Administrative Action or Opinion in Sales and Use Tax Cases, 64 DICK. L. REv. 47, 48 (1959).
109. MINN. STAT. §§ 8.05, 8.07, 270.09, & 297A.29 (1967).
110. The Commissioner of Taxation has as yet only issued unpublished Department Rulings which are used by department employees in
administering the sales tax. Mm.. STAT. § 15.0412(4) (1967) provides
that "[n]o rule shall be adopted by any agency subsequent to the effective date of sections 15.0411 to 15.0422" unless the procedures of § 15.0412
(4) are followed. These procedures include holding a hearing on 30 days
written notice to interested persons, after which the proposed rule is
submitted to the Attorney General for his approval. If approved, the
Attorney General promptly files the rule in the office of the Secretary of

State. Thereafter, the rule is given "the force and effect of law upon its

further filing in the office of the commissioner of administration."
MiNN. STAT. § 15.0413(1) (1967).
Arguably, the Commissioner is not
justified in promulgating these Department Rulings without following
the Administrative Procedure Act, since they are clearly included in the
definition of "Rules" in MAbn. STAT. § 15.0411(3) (1967). But even if
the Commissioner had strictly followed the procedures of § 15.0412(4),
his rules would still only have the force and effect of law to the extent
not inconsistent with the sales tax act as provided by MAUN. STAT. §
297A.29 (1967), since Mnw. STAT. § 15.C412(1) (1967) provides that in
adopting rules pursuant to §§ 15.0411-.0422 an agency may not exceed
the powers vested in it by statute.
This is not to say, however, that these Department Rulings should
not have any reliance value for the purpose of estopping the state from
collecting back sales taxes. These rulings represent the official position
of the tax department in administering the sales tax, and in effect have
been promulgated pursuant to the procedural safeguards and formalities
of Mlux. STAT. § 15.0412(4) (1967). Typically, the Commissioner requests an Attorney General's opinion which he adopts in his Department
Ruling. The approval of the Attorney General is received in advance,

without benefit of formal hearing.

Yet Mmn,.

STAT.

§ 270.09 (1967)

still requires the Commissioner to follow the opinion of the Attorney

General, rendering the fact of the hearing moot. Thus, reliance by the

taxpayer seems equally justified in both situations.
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foreign jurisdictions would agree with the equities if not the result."' It is unlikely that the seller's reliance would be found unreasonable unless the Commissioner's or the Attorney General's
interpretation was obviously wrong or unless the seller had misconstrued it. But the seller would still have to show that he had
suffered detrimental reliance in order to make out a case of estoppel. 11 2 In many instances the seller will have records of his
purchasers and the sales tax act would apparently allow him to
recover the tax from them." 3 If the seller does have such records and can collect the tax from the purchasers, he should be
unable to show detrimental reliance unless the expense of collecting the back tax plus the amount which proved. uncollectible
would be disproportionately high in comparison to the total back
tax. There will, however, be instances where the seller does not
have such records and will, therefore, be forced to pay the back
tax out of his own funds. This is the situation where it would be
highly inequitable to deny the availability of the estoppel defense. Thus, estoppel does provide room for achieving substantial justice in sales tax cases while protecting the state's interest
in guarding its revenues.
Even though the Minnesota Supreme Court has never estopped the state from collecting a tax in the past, 1 4 a major
break with precedent would not be required to make the defense
available in sales tax cases. The mere fact that an activity of
111. Hoffman v. City of Syracuse, 2 N.Y.2d 484, 161 N.Y.S.2d 111,
141 N.E.2d 605 (1957) (city estopped by reliance on an official ruling);
see Duhame v. State Tax Comm'n, 65 Ariz. 268, 179 P.2d 252 (1947)
(reliance on an official ruling did not lead to an estoppel but the case
dealt with the sales tax liability of a purchaser rather than a seller);
Market St. Ry. v. California State Bd. of Equalization, 137 Cal. App.
2d 87, 290 P.2d 20 (1955) (although reliance on an official ruling did not
lead to an estoppel, the court said it would have if the retailer had been
a collecting agent of the state); Henderson v. Gill, 229 N.C. 313, 49
S.E.2d 754 (1948) (reliance on an official representation did not lead to
an estoppel but the court felt it was an unjust result); Wasem's, Inc.
v. State, 63 Wash. 2d 67, 385 P.2d 530 (1963) (court intimated that the
state could be estopped from collecting back sales taxes in a proper

case of reliance on the published rulings of the tax commission).

112. E.g., Niaze v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 265 Minn. 222, 228 n.5,
121 N.W.2d 349, 354 n.5 (1963); Grier v. Estate of Grier, 252 Minn. 143,
150, 89 N.W.2d 398, 404 (1958).
113. Mnx. STAT. § 297A.03 (1) (1967): "The tax ... shall be a debt

from the purchaser to the seller recoverable at law in the same manner

as other debts."
114. Spratt v. Hatfield, 267 Minn. 535, 127 N.W.2d 545 (1964); In re
Estate of Abbott, 213 Minn. 289, 6 N.W.2d 466 (1942); State v. Illinois
Cent. R.R., 200 Minn. 583, 274 N.W. 828 (1937); State v. Brooks, 183

Minn. 251, 236 N.W. 316 (1931).
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the state is deemed an exercise of sovereign power in one instance
does not require that all activities in the same area be deemed
exercises of sovereign power. In State v. Horrn 5 the state
claimed it could not be estopped from challenging a timber lease
compromise because the lands involved were school lands, received and held in its sovereign capacity. The court held the
state estopped, saying that even though the state held the lands
in its sovereign capacity it did not follow that its capacity in
executing and bringing an action on the lease was not proprietary in nature. The court reached the same conclusion five years
6
later in State v. Gardiner.1
These cases open the way for the conclusion that the state
acts in its sovereign capacity when it adds a sales tax to the price
the consumer pays for retail goods, but that it acts in its contractual capacity when it requires the retail seller to collect the
tax from the purchaser.11 7 Once this conclusion is reached, the
defense of estoppel is available" 58 under what the Minnesota
courts have enunciated as the general rule." 9
115. 165 Minn. 1, 5, 205 N.W. 444, 445 (1925):
If the state . . . received these lands in its sovereign capacity

to hold in trust for the school fund, it does not follow that it
does not act in its proprietary capacity in making contracts and
conducting litigation in reference thereto.... What it is required to do with the money received is not the question.

The prosecution of this suit is not an attribute of sovereignty.

116. 181 Minn. 513, 233 N.W. 16 (1930).
117. By way of analogy, it would not be an unusual arrangement
between a principal and his agent for the principal to presume that
any merchandise missing from the agent's stock had been sold for cash
and to require a remittance unless the agent could show that it was
sold on authorized credit. Such an arrangement would not transform
the agent into an independent businessman who buys the stock and
bears the risk of resale himself. A principal would certainly be estopped from holding his agent liable for the price of goods which he

had directed the agent to deliver free of charge. Cf. Towle v. Norbest
Turkey Growers Ass'n, 275 F.2d 196, 201 (9th Cir. 1960); Inland Empire
Refineries v. Jones, 206 P.2d 519 (Idaho 1949). Likewise, if the state is
not acting in its sovereign capacity when giving directions to the retaller on how to collect the tax, and the seller relies on an official rule or
regulation in not collecting it, the defense of estoppel should be available
to him even without an exception to the general rule.
118.

The above rationale is even more compelling in the case of a

retail seller required to collect the state's use tax. It is obvious he is
nothing more than a collecting agent for the state. The use tax not only
has provisions making it illegal to assume the tax, MA-xw. STAT. § 297A.18
(1967), and stating that the tax is a debt owed by the purchaser to the
seller, MINN. STAT. § 297A.17 (1967), but the language of the act even
imposes the tax on the person who will use the item in Minnesota.
ATn=. STAT. § 297A.14 (1967).
119. E.g., Spratt v. Hatfield, 267 Minn. 535, 127 N.W.2d 545 (1964);
Youngstown Mines Corp. v. Prout, 266 Minn. 450, 124 N.W.2d 328 (1963);

19691

MINNESOTA SALES TAX

Even if the Minnesota courts refuse to accept the contention
that the retail seller is in substance a mere collecting agent under
the sales tax and that the state deals with him in its contractual
capacity, it does not necessarily follow that the defense of estoppel will be unavailable. As previously stated, 120 the Minnesota
Supreme Court has recently said that estoppel is only generally
unavailable when the state acts in its sovereign capacity. 121 Indeed, on one occasion the court has estopped the state when acting in its sovereign, although nontaxing, capacity. 22 It has
abated penalties for late payment of taxes caused by justifiable
reliance on the tax department, 23 and has also stated that the
availability of estoppel should be controlled by the facts of each
case. 12 4 Thus, a holding that the state can be estopped by a
proper showing in a sales tax case would not be entirely inconsistent with past decisions. Such an exception to the general rule
that the state cannot be estopped from collecting taxes 125 would
intend the rebe entirely justified since the legislature did not
26
tailer to pay the sales tax out of his own funds.

B. THE LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
Even if estoppel were made available to the retailer in sales
tax cases, difficulties might arise in establishing the defense. A
court, for example, could hold either that the seller's reliance on
the administrative interpretation was unjustified because he had
equal knowledge of all relevant facts 12 7 or that reliance on opinions of the Attorney General cannot support a case of estoppel
State v. Gardiner, 181 Minn. 513, 233 N.W. 16 (1930); State v. Horr, 165
Minn. 1, 205 N.W. 444 (1925).

120. See note 59 supra, and accompanying text.
121. Spratt v. Hatfield, 267 Minn. 535, 539, 127 N.W.2d 545, 548

(1964); Board of Educ. v. Sand, 227 Minn. 202, 211, 34 N.W.2d 689, 695
(1948).
122. State ex rel. Douglas v. School Dist. No. 108, 85 Minn. 230,
88 N.W.751 (1902).
123. In re Estate of Abbott, 213 Minn. 289, 6 N.W.2d 466 (1942);
Lindquist v. Abbett, 196 Minn. 233, 265 N.W. 54 (1936).
124. State v. Horr, 165 Minn. 1, 205 N.W. 444 (1925).
125. Spratt v. Hatfield, 267 Minn. 535, 127 N.W.2d 545 (1964); In re
Estate of Abbott, 213 Minn. 289, 6 N.W.2d 466 (1942); State v. Illinois

Cent. R.R., 200 Minn. 583, 274 N.W. 828 (1937); State v. Brooks, 183
Minn. 251, 236 N.W. 316 (1931).
126. See La Soci~t6 Frangaise De Bienfaisance Mutuelle v. California
Employment Comm'n, 56 Cal. App. 2d 534, 133 P.2d 47 (1943). See also
notes 74 & 75 supra, and accompanying text.

127. E.g., Browning v. Browning, 246 Minn. 327, 331, 76 N.W.2d 100,
103 (1956); Johnson v. Giese, 231 Minn. 258, 264, 42 N.W.2d 712, 716
(1950).
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because they are merely his personal opinions. 128 Thus, the best
solution would be an amendment to the statute itself.
The legislature could merely strike the words "not inconsistent with its provisions"'129 from the act. Such an approach, however, would not provide as much protection for the state as the
following suggested amendment which would also insure ample
protection for the retailer:
Minnesota Statutes section 297A.29(2) (a)-(d) (1967):
(a) No person shall suffer substantial prejudice due to his
reasonable and good faith reliance on an opinion of the attorney
general or a rule or regulation of the commissioner of taxation
interpreting sections 297A.01-297A.44.
(b) Substantial prejudice shall not include the necessity of collecting a back sales tax from known purchasers unless the cost
of collection (plus the amounts which prove uncollectible) exceeds 25 per cent of the tax, but it shall include the payment of
any back sales tax out of the seller's own funds which the law
(as interpreted by the opinions of the attorney general or rules
and regulations of the commissioner of taxation, issued in a
valid exercise of their powers) did not require him to collect.
(c) Whether the seller has suffered substantial prejudice by a
reasonable and good faith reliance shall be determined by a
court of competent jurisdiction in an action brought by the
seller for abatement of an assessment or for a refund.
(d) The commissioner shall rule on all questions submitted to
him by retail sellers on their liability to collect a tax under
sections 297A.01-297A.44.
At first impression, this may seem too great a concession
since every seller would be able-to rely on a single rule or regulation of the Commissioner of Taxation or a single opinion of the
Attorney General. It is clear, however, that the seller would still
have to show that his circumstances were sufficiently similar to
those of the rule, regulation or opinion to make his reliance
reasonable, as required by the amendment. Furthermore, it
seems unlikely that the Internal Revenue Service's approach of
issuing letter rulings which can be relied on only by the taxpayer
who requested the ruling 130 would be a better solution. For ex128. The seller who has relied on an official opinion of the Attorney
General which had not been incorporated into a rule or regulation of
the Commissioner of Taxation may run afoul of the requirement that an
estoppel be based on a representation of fact rather than opinion.
Bremer v. Commissioner, 246 Minn. 446, 454-55, 75 N.W.2d 470, 475
(1956). It is doubtful, however, that this is the way in which the courts
use the word "opinion" since the Attorney General's opinions are phrased
so as to state facts, and certain of his opinions are even given a binding
effect by statute. MINN. STAT. §§ 8.02, 270.09 (1967).
(1967).
129. MnIN. STAT. § 297A.29 (1967).
130. See REv. Rul. 172, § 12.05, 1954-1 Cum. BuLL. 401; K. DAVIS,
ADmawSTTmVE LAw 96 (1965).
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ample, once the tax department has decided that certain sales
are exempt from the sales tax, the only appreciable difference
between a single ruling on which every seller can rely and a series
of separate rulings on which only one seller can rely is the inefficiency of the latter method. The same is true if the tax department subsequently changes its view since it is obviously more
efficient to issue a single ruling applicable to all sellers than to
change its position in all future rulings and also advise each
seller who had received an earlier ruling of the change.
In any event, there is no excuse for the legislature to give the
Attorney General and Commissioner of Taxation broad powers to
interpret the sales tax without also providing meaningful protection for sellers who rely on their interpretations. The granting of such powers without at the same time protecting the seller's reliance not only lulls the retailer who complies with the interpretations into a false sense of security but also tends to undermine the integrity of the administrative process. Thus, whether
the legislature chooses to protect the retail seller's reliance by
the suggested amendment or by the more restrictive approach of
requiring separate rulings, it is clear that some degree of protection is warranted.
V. CONCLUSION
Considering the state's interest in protecting its revenues, a
general rule forbidding assertion of the defense of estoppel
against the state when exercising its taxing power may be tolerable. It becomes intolerable, however, if applied to a sales tax
situation where the so-called taxpayer merely collects the tax for
the state and is not himself meant to pay the tax out of his own
funds. Thus, estoppel should be made available to the retailer in
sales tax cases, either by the courts or the legislature. It is by no
means unreasonable for the state to bear the risk of mistaken
interpretations by its own authorized officials when the consequences of the risk, if borne by the retailer, would range from
paying no tax with personal funds when the interpretation is
correct, to being saddled with the full tax when the interpretation is wrong.

